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Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture 
Singapore Management University, 15 May 2009 
The Effective Reach of in personam Reasoning in Private International Law 
Within the equitable jurisdiction, the phrase in personam has been used to describe the 
means of enforcement of the equitable decree, the justification for equitable jurisdiction 
generally, and the mechanism by which chancery rulings effectively override the common 
law. In the context of curial proceedings, the phrase is also used to describe the nature of 
jurisdiction assumed over a person, as well as the effect of a decree against a person, as 
opposed to a thing. In the discourse on rights, it is used to distinguish personal from 
property rights. In personam reasoning in the equitable sense has been used historically to 
justify the assumption of jurisdiction in disputes relating to foreign immovable property, and 
the application of the principles of equity of the forum without reference to choice of law. In 
more modern times, similar reasoning has been used to justify cross-border anti-suit 
injunctions and asset-freezing orders. In this lecture, the uses of in personam reasoning in 
private international law in these contexts will be evaluated, and further implications for the 
context of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments will be considered, with 
particular reference to the law in Singapore. 
Introduction 
‘In Personam”: Multiple Personalities 
[1] “In personam” is one of the most potent phrases in the law. The maxim “equity acts in personam” 
is intended to strike fear in those who seek to hide behind the rules of the common law.1 What 
does it really mean? Its original meaning was tied to the early nature of the chancery 
jurisdiction. Unlike the common law courts, the chancery court had no machinery to execute its 
decrees against the property of the defendant. All it could do was to compel the defendant to 
perform on pain of imprisonment. The decree of the court only acted against the person of the 
defendant; hence it operated “in personam”. This is no longer true as a matter of procedure.2 
[2] The phrase “equity acts in personam” is also often used synonymously as “equity acts on the 
conscience”. The chancery court could only summon within its jurisdiction people whose 
conscience has been affected in some way. This is the historical as well as modern justification 
for the existence of the equitable jurisdiction.3  
[3] The most significant aspect of the maxim that “equity acts in personam”, as far as this paper is 
concerned, is that it is a technique of reasoning based on outflanking through 
recharacterisation. Before judicial independence became entrenched, the harmonious co-
existence of the common law courts and the chancery court depended on a balance of political 
power and sheer diplomacy. The chancery court avoided direct conflict with the common law 
courts by this technique of acting in personam.4 The trustee holds all the powers of a legal 
                                                             
1 Early chancery intervention frequently took the form of the common injunction to restrain the 
defendant from relying on common law rights. 
2 It had not been so from about the sixteenth century. 
3 Hence, the bona fide purchaser of legal interest for value without notice stood outside its jurisdiction. 
His conscience is clear, and he does not need to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court for his legal 
title. 
4 The conflict, though very real, was generally kept under control. However, it did come to a confrontation 
in the Earl of Oxford’s case (1615) 1 Ch Rep 1, 21 ER 485, which the King of England had to resolve, and he 
did in favour of the chancery court. The king’s decision survives to today in the maxim “where common 
law and equity conflict, equity prevails”. It is also enshrined in statute: Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev 
Ed), s 4(13). 
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owner, but equity acts in personam to restrain or compel him as necessary to give effect to 
equitable principles relating to the trust institution. Strangers to the trust taking legal title were 
legal owners, no doubt, but again equity acts in personam to ensure that the equitable 
institution of the trust is adequately protected. The result today is not a system of legal title with 
equitable restraints, but a system of property with legal and equitable interests5 which attract 
different rules. ‘[E]quity has proved that from the materials of obligation you can counterfeit the 
phenomena of property’.6 This is an important point, for it illustrates that acting in personam 
does not necessarily mean the enforcement of obligations only. 
[4] This bypass technique is of tremendous significance both historically and in the modern context. 
Where the system of holding legal property led to injustice, equitable interests were created. 
Where rules of contract law led to injustice, personal equities were created. The classic example 
is the promissory estoppel, but other examples included the equity to rescind for non-
fraudulent misrepresentation, undue influence and unconscionability. It is important to note 
that the technique is driven by important substantive considerations of justice and fairness. 
Historically, the technique went so far as to overcome statutory formalities, principally the 
Statute of Frauds. Even in modern times, the English Parliament found it hard to restrain such 
intervention.7  
[5] There are, of course, substantive limits. In the domestic context, landmark Court of Appeal case 
in Singapore, United Overseas Bank Ltd v Bebe bte Mohammad,8 held the “in personam” reasoning 
in check in the context of registered land titles. In private international law context, in Relfo Ltd 
v Bhimji Velji Jadva Varsani,9 the in personam reasoning inherent in a claim for knowing receipt 
of assets received in breach of trust could not overcome the public policy objection that a claim 
which directly or indirectly enforces a foreign revenue law was not justiciable in the Singapore 
court. 
[6] The wider significance of this technique, which goes beyond the strict equitable jurisdiction, lies 
in the focus of the law on the personal dealings between the parties as a source of rights and 
obligations. This is in contrast to early thinking in private international law which focussed on 
connections of people, things or actions with territories.10 The personal equities could be in the 
form of contract,11 or other dealings not amounting to a contract. This will form the broader 
theme of this lecture.  
[7] “In personam” is also often used in opposition to “in rem”, to refer to personal rights and 
obligations, in contrast to rights in property exigible against third parties. This is very much a 
                                                             
5 Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 at 371. 
6 SFC Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (2nd edn, 1981) at 6. 
7 See, eg, Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s 2(8) abolishing the doctrine of part 
performance, and the reaction of the English court in utilising estoppel instead: Yaxley v Gotts [2000] Ch 
162 (CA). 
8 [2006] 4 SLR 884 (CA). 
9 [2008] 4 SLR 657. 
10 A large influencing factor for this early development was the doctrine of vested rights which held that 
foreign rights which were territorially vested had to be enforced by the court of the forum. This thinking 
was the basis of the first Restatement of the Conflict of Laws in the United States. It has generally been 
accepted to be debunked for the reason that it begs the question why the forum court should look to the 
law of that particular foreign territory in the first place. 
11 A recent magisterial study on the relationship between contractual rights and private international law 
is A Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (OUP, 2008). A broader study on the role of party 
autonomy in private international law relating to contracts is PE Nygh, Autonomy in International 
Contracts (OUP, 1999). 
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modern rationalisation, but it represents a fundamental distinction that is upheld in most legal 
systems. This is not to be confused with the “in personam” reasoning mentioned above. 
[8] Finally, in the context of civil procedure and particularly in the context of private international 
law, “in personam” and “in rem” have specific meanings which should be distinguished from the 
meanings discussed above. In the jurisdictional context, in personam jurisdiction is obtained 
over a person when the court has obtained legal authority to pronounce on his rights and 
liabilities. In rem jurisdiction is obtained in respect of an item of property for the purpose of 
pronouncing on the rights to the ownership of the property, and if necessary making orders as 
to its disposal. It is important to understand that in personam and in rem jurisdiction do not 
necessarily lead respectively to in personam or in rem judgment. Whether a judgment is in 
personam or in rem depends on whether it is intended to bind the litigants only, or the whole 
world at large, and it is legally and practically possible that a judgment has both qualities.12  
[9] Private international law deals with three major topics: jurisdiction, choice of law, and foreign 
judgments.  
Jurisdiction 
[10] The basis of in personam jurisdiction in Singapore is entirely statutory,13 but it broadly reflects 
the common law position as supplemented by statute in England.14 The in personam jurisdiction 
of the Singapore court is based on the presence or submission of the defendant within the 
territory at the time of the service of process. In addition, the court has discretion to grant leave 
for service of process abroad in accordance with the rules of court. Generally, these rules 
require a connection between the defendant, the cause of action or the subject matter of the 
suit, with Singapore.  
Prohibition against deciding Foreign Title and the In Personam Exception 
[11] There is an important limitation to such jurisdiction of the court recognised from a very early 
time. The court has no jurisdiction to determine a dispute relating to title to foreign land.15 The 
origin of the rule was based on the old procedure of requiring a jury to be constituted from the 
locality of the land, and it was impossible to form a jury when the dispute relates to foreign land. 
The modern justification is based on the substantive considerations of international comity 
(respecting the policies of the situs of the land) and pragmatism (the situs has the final say on 
the enforcement of any local/foreign decrees affecting the land).16 This limitation is clearly part 
of Singapore law.17  
[12] There is an important exception to this limitation. Even when the dispute relates to title to 
foreign land, in personam jurisdiction may still be obtained over the defendant if the court is 
                                                             
12 Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85 (PC, Kenya). 
13 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 16; Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co 
Ltd [2007] 2 SLR 453 at [20]-[21]; Indo Commercial Society (Pte) Ltd v Ebrahim [1992] 2 SLR 1041 at 
1056; Emilia Shipping Inc v State Enterprises for Pulp and Paper Industries [1991] 1 SLR 615 at 621-622; 
Muhd Munir v Noor Hidah [1990] SLR 999 at 1007. 
14 This has become residual jurisdiction as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, given the prevalence 
of European law. 
15 British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602. 
16 Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd [1979] AC 508. 
17 Murakami Takako (executrix of the estate of Takashi Murakami Suroso, deceased) v Wiryadi Louise Maria 
(No 2) [2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA) at [9]. Murakami Takako (executrix of the estate of Takashi Murakami 
Suroso, deceased) v Wiryadi Louise Maria [2007] 4 SLR 565 (CA) at [41]-[46]; Eng Liat Kiang v Eng Bak 
Hern [1995] 3 SLR 97 (CA). 
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enforcing personal equities between the parties.18 Penn v Baltimore19 is the classic authority for 
this proposition.20 The English court held that it clearly had jurisdiction in respect of an 
agreement to partition land, even if the land is in America. This was where the historical in 
personam reasoning was at its most potent. The decree was not intended to be executed against 
the property, but only enforced against the person. The recharacterisation is evident; the court 
sees a contractual dispute, not a dispute about land. The modern view of this case is that the 
court was being asked to enforce contractual obligations, so that jurisdiction exercised was 
entirely appropriate. The jurisdiction is not, however, confined to pure obligations as such. 
Because of the way the nature of the chancery jurisdiction has developed through acting in 
personam, it can still see obligations within traditional property concepts. For example, the 
express, constructive, or resulting trust is clearly recognized as a concept of property law, but 
the strings that the beneficiary can pull on the trustee are part of the personal equities that form 
this in personam exception.21 However, there are no personal equities where the liability of a 
constructive trustee is alleged to arise because of principles of property law (eg, constructive 
notice in taking title). There is a further important limitation to this exception. The jurisdiction 
stops where the law of the situs has destroyed or presents an impediment to the enforcement of 
the personal equity.   
[13] This type of jurisdiction was historically important when litigants did not have much faith in 
foreign or colonial courts, and it was economically significant for the English court to enforce 
charges over foreign land to encourage entrepreneurs to engage in economic activities in the 
colonies. Today the significance is much narrower, and is more likely to arise in cases where 
parties are trying to trace the proceeds of fraud from one jurisdiction to another. 
[14] All this is subject matter limitation to in personam jurisdiction;22 this is why it is not spelt out in 
the legislative provision governing in personam jurisdiction in the statute.23 Where the 
territorial in personam jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it does not matter whether the 
court is acting in personam in this equitable sense or not. The rules of in personam jurisdiction 
are the same whether the claim is in respect of common law or equity, or whether it is in 
relation to foreign immovable property.24  
The Mareva Injunction 
[15] Two modern specific areas where the reasoning of the court acting in personam has been 
applied in the context of jurisdiction are the Mareva injunction and the anti-suit injunction. In 
the case of the Mareva injunction, the courts addressed the need to prevent the dissipation of 
assets before judgment by acting on the person of the defendant even if the property is 
overseas. Here the law is acting in personam pure and simple; it is not acting on any property or 
                                                             
18 There is another exception based on the incidental determination of title in the court’s jurisdiction to 
administer estates. This exception is beyond the scope of this lecture. 
19 (1750) 1 Ves Sen 444, 27 ER 1132.  
20 It may be traced back to at least Arglasse v Muschamp (1682) 1 Vern 75, 23 ER 322. 
21 This type of jurisdiction has obtained approval from the European Court of Justice: Case C-294/92 
Webb v Webb [1994] ECR I-1717. 
22 Murakami Takako (executrix of the estate of Takashi Murakami Suroso, deceased) v Wiryadi Louise Maria 
(No 2) [2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA) at [8]. 
23 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 16. 
24 Murakami Takako (executrix of the estate of Takashi Murakami Suroso, deceased) v Wiryadi Louise Maria  
[2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA) at [12]-[22], clarifying that the exercise of the in personam exception to the 
Moçambique rule does not depend on the connections of the facts with the forum.  
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personal rights; no rights have been established at this stage of the proceedings.25 The legal 
basis of the Mareva injunction has been much debated, but the best explanation for it is that it is 
a tool of the court to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.26 It has nothing to do with 
personal equities at all. Recently there has been controversy in Singapore whether the Mareva 
injunction could or should be used in aid of foreign proceedings, ie, to prevent the abuse of 
foreign process.27 Traditionally, the common law has only been concerned with abuses of its 
own processes; it has no concern with foreign processes.28 Lending aid to foreign courts raise 
difficult questions of policy, which I think may be better resolved by Parliament. What should 
perhaps be given greater consideration is the question of the extent to which local process 
should be prevented from abuse. Once proceedings are commenced in Singapore, it can amount 
to an abuse of process for the defendant to dissipate assets in order to frustrate the enforcement 
of a local judgment. Should it make any difference that the Singapore courts then decide that it is 
not the natural forum, and the case is then decided elsewhere and the result is a foreign 
judgment sought to be enforced in Singapore? Arguably, there is scope for a limited jurisdiction 
in respect of assets in Singapore in such cases.29 
The Anti-Suit Injunction 
[16] The anti-suit injunction is another classic case of recharacterisation. The court cannot tell 
another court in a foreign country to stop its proceedings, but it can order someone within its in 
personam jurisdiction not to commence or continue proceedings overseas. It is important to 
note there are different types of anti-suit injunctions. There are injunctions intended to prevent 
abuse of local process; these tend to occur in the jurisdiction of the courts in administering 
estates, including insolvency. The most common type of anti-suit is based on the acts by one 
party in a foreign jurisdiction which are regarded as vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable to 
the other party in view of the local forum being the natural forum for the trial of the case.30 
Here, the focus is again on the personal equities between the parties, the conduct of one party 
against another in relation to their pending litigation in the natural forum. More pronounced is 
the anti-suit injunction in cases of an exclusive forum jurisdiction clause is intended to enforce 
                                                             
25 The injunction may also be available post-judgment after the rights have been established. The basis of 
such an injunction is far less controversial since the court has already pronounced on the rights of the 
judgment creditor. 
26 Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380; Searose Ltd v Seatrain UK Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 894 at 
897; Barclay-Johnson v Yuill [1980] 3 All ER 190 at 1974; Art Trend Ltd v Blue Dolphin (Pte) Ltd [1982-
1983] SLR 362 at 367. 
27 Swift-Fortune Ltd v Magnafica Marine SA [2007] 1 SLR 629 (CA); Multi-Code Electronics Industries (M) 
Bhd v Toh Chun Toh Gordon [2009] 1 SLR 1000. 
28 It has no jurisdiction to intervene in foreign processes: R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
[1995] QB 313 (CA). 
29 Bambang Sutrisno v Bali International Finance Ltd [1999] 3 SLR 140 (CA); Multi-Code Electronics 
Industries (M) Bhd v Toh Chun Toh Gordon [2009] 1 SLR 1000; House of Spring Gardens v Waite [1985] FSR 
173 (CA). In these cases the injunctions could be sustained on the basis of a stayed jurisdiction (local 
proceedings held in suspense). A more difficult problem arises in the context of Order 11 service out of 
jurisdiction where the usual consequence of finding that Singapore is not the natural forum is the 
dismissal rather than stay of proceedings, and an unnatural forum cannot become a natural forum simply 
for the purpose of maintaining a Mareva injunction: Baidini v Baidini [1987] 2 FLR 463 (CA), esp at 465; 
A/S D/S Svendborg v Maxim Brand Inc (23 January 1989). Conceptually, the largest hurdle is the need for 
an existing cause of action justiciable within the jurisdiction; on any view, the cause of action on the 
foreign judgment is an independent one and cannot exist until the foreign judgment is granted. It is 
different from the substantive cause of action in respect of which jurisdiction has initially been assumed 
in Singapore. This latter cause of action is not merged into the foreign judgment; see note 89 below. 
30 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospeatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871; Koh Kay Yew v Inno-Pacific 
Holdings Ltd [1997] 3 SLR 12 (CA); Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v Djoni Widjaja 
[1994] 2 SLR 816 (CA); Trane US Inc v Kirkham [2008] SGHC 240. 
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the contract between the parties. The basis of this type of anti-suit injunction (and also that to 
prevent a breach of an arbitration agreement) is today recognised to be the personal equity 
generated by the agreement of the parties.31 Hence the test is different; strong cause needs to be 
shown why the parties should not be held to their jurisdiction agreement in the contract.32 
The Broader Theme: From Territorial to Transactional Analysis in Jurisdiction 
[17] This brings us to a broader trend in international litigation which increasingly places more 
focus on the personal equities between the parties, not necessarily in the strict domestic 
equitable sense, but in the sense of personal dealings between the parties.  
[18] The most significant of these developments has actually been in the law of international 
arbitration. The recognition of the importance of party autonomy in the procedural context has 
generated an entire global system of international dispute resolution. Now there is concerted 
international effort to replicate this success for litigation, in the form of the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements.33 Another developing area is the law on mediation agreements. 
[19] Of course, in common law system, there is already a long and established tradition of giving 
effect to jurisdiction agreements by stay of proceedings. The modern rationale for stay of 
proceedings on this basis is the enforcement of the contract between the parties;34 this is why 
strong cause amounting to exceptional circumstances is required to show why the jurisdiction 
agreement should not be enforced.35 More recently, the question has arisen whether damages 
are available for breach of contract for the breach of a jurisdiction agreement. The English court 
has gone so far as to allow the recovery of costs incurred in foreign jurisdiction to strike out 
proceedings commenced in breach of contract36 (this can be seen as mitigation of losses arising 
from breach of contract), and the dicta in English cases have gone so far as to suggest that 
substantial damages may in fact be recoverable to reflect the full loss resulting from the breach 
of contract.37  
[20] In a very interesting development in April 2009, the Supreme Court in Spain, the highest court 
of Spain for civil matters, decided that substantial damages were available on the basis of breach 
                                                             
31 The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 (HL) at 96; Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association 
(Eurasia) Ltd v. New India Assurance Association Co Ltd [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67 (CA), [2004] EWCA Civ 
1598; West Tankers Inv v Ras Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurta SpA [2005] EWHC 454 (Comm); WSG Nimbus 
Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 3 SLR 603. 
32 Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] l Lloyd’s Rep 425 (HL). 
33 Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. It has not yet entered into force:  see 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98 (last accessed on 13 May 2009). The 
European Community and the United States have both signed. Mexico was the first signatory and remains 
the only other signatory at present. 
34 Racecourse Betting Control Board v Secretary for Air[1944] Ch 114 (CA) at 126; The Fehrmarn [1958] 1 
WLR 159 (CA) at 163-164. 
35 See eg, The Hyundai Fortune [2004] 4 SLR 548; The Vishva Apurva [1992] 2 SLR 175 (CA) 182; Amerco 
Timbers Pte Ltd v Chatsworth Timber Corp Pte Ltd [1975–1977] SLR 258 (CA) 260; The El Amria [1981] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 119. 
36 Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller [2002] 1 WLR 1517, [2001] EWCA Civ 1755. See also A/S D/S Svendborg, 
D/S Af 1912 A/S, Bodies Corporate Trading in Partnership as Maersk Sealand v Ali Hussein Akar  [2003] 
EWHC Comm 797. 
37 Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] l Lloyd’s Rep 425 (HL) at [48]. See also See also D Tan, “Damages for 
Breach of Jurisdiction Clauses” [2002] SAcLJ 342; D Tan & N Yeo, “Breaking Promises to Litigate in a 
Particular Forum: Are Damages an Appropriate Remedy?” [2003] LMCLQ 435; cf CH Tham, “Damages for 
breach of English jurisdiction clauses: more than meets the eye” [2004] LMCLQ 46; LC Ho, “Anti-suit 
injunctions in cross-border insolvency: A Restatement” (2003) 52 ICLQ 697, 707-709. 
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of a jurisdiction agreement in a contract.38 This is highly interesting because while many 
common lawyers have argued the availability of such damages because they say a jurisdiction 
agreement is a term of the contract like any other term in the contract, it is mainly the civil 
lawyers who argue that the jurisdiction agreement only has procedural significance and does 
not give rise to the usual contractual remedies. This is a particularly important development 
within the context of the European Union, because the use of the anti-suit injunction in cases 
falling within the Brussels I Regulation which controls the allocation of jurisdiction within the 
European Union has been practically eradicated.39 This may hold some lessons for the common 
law. Because the anti-sut injunction is seen to be intrusive of foreign proceedings in spite of the 
in personam label,40 in personam techniques like damages for breach of contract (or even tort or 
delict41)42 may turn out to be more acceptable techniques. 
Choice of Law 
Court Acting In Personam according to Which Law? 
[21] In the context of choice of law, the “personal equities” reasoning in the strict sense had led the 
law somewhat astray, while in the broader sense of having a stronger focus on the equities 
between parties it has been a beneficent informing principle in important developments in 
choice of law rules particularly in the law of obligations. 
[22] For a long time, it was thought that once the court exercised its equitable jurisdiction and acted 
in personam on the defendant, all it applied was the law of the forum. There was no question of 
choice of law when it came to the application of equitable principles. This view appears to be 
still prevailing in Australia,43 but has come under challenge elsewhere. Here, the Singapore 
Court of Appeal, has contributed two leading decisions44 to Commonwealth jurisprudence, 
making it clear that equitable principles are subject to choice of law analysis in the same way 
that common law rules have long been understood to be. The question of jurisdiction and choice 
of law are conceptually separate, and the exercise of equitable jurisdiction still requires prior 
consideration of what is the law to be applied to the merits of the case. In other words, the 
maxim “equity acts in personam” in the strict sense which is the foundation of all equitable 
doctrines is a principle of domestic law only. One has to decide that what the domestic 
                                                             
38 STS (Sala de lo Civil, Sección 1a), sentencia núm. 6/2009 de 12 Enero. RJ 2009\544. 
39 Case C-185/07 Allianz SpA v West Tankers Inc (ECJ, 10 February 2009); Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit 
[2004] 2 Lloyd’s 169 (ECJ); Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISA Srl [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222 (ECJ). 
40  The indirect interference long has been acknowledged: see eg, Société Nationale Industrielle 
Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 (PC Brunei); Turner v Grovit [2002] 1 WLR 107 (HL) at [22]-[29]. 
The German court saw an English anti-suit injunction as a grave affront with constitutional consequences: 
Re Enforcement of an English Anti-Suit Injunction [1997] ILPr 320. See also Phillip Alexander Securities and 
Futures Ltd v Bamberger [1997] ILPr 73 at [48]. The English court reacted with similar disgust to a New 
York anti-suit injunction: General Star International Indemnity Ltd v Stirling Cooke Brown Reinsurance 
Brokers Ltd [2003] ILPr 19. Of course, an anti-suit injunction may be met by an anti-anti-suit injunction, 
which can in turn be countered by an anti-anti-anti-suit injunction. 
41 Horn Linie GmbH & Co v Panamericana Formas E Impresos SA [2006] EWHC 373 (Comm), at [26]. 
42 And, possibly, refusal to recognise foreign judgments obtained in breach of contract, discussed below. 
43 Paramasivam v Flynn (1998) 160 ALR 202 (FCA); National Commercial Bank v Wimborne (1978) 5 BPR 
[97423]; OZ-US Film Productions Pty Ltd v Heath [2000] NSWSC 967; OZ-US Film Productions Pty Ltd v 
Heath [2001] NSWSC 298; Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky [2006] QSC 66, (2006) 57 ACSR 389. 
44 Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron Von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR 377 (CA); Murakami Takako 
(executrix of the estate of Takashi Murakami Suroso, deceased) v Wiryadi Louise Maria [2009] 1 SLR 508 
(CA). See also Focus Energy Ltd v Aye Aye Soe [2009] 1 SLR 1086. 
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applicable law is, and then apply that law, including its principles of equity (if any). This is a 
trend that is supported by recent developments in England45 as well as in New Zealand.46 
No Equitable Bypass of Characterisation in Choice of Law 
[23] One important consequence of this is that it is important to deal with the question of the choice 
of law for and the characterisation of issues involving equitable principles. Characterisation is 
an essential step in the common law choice of law methodology which leads to the relevant 
applicable law. Choice of law characterisation is a totally different legal creature from 
characterisation in domestic law; its only purpose is to inform the court as to the function of the 
type of rules involved in the issue thereby indicating the direction of the most appropriate 
applicable law. Characterisation of equitable doctrines is floating on largely uncharted waters,47 
but there are promising signs that at least it is floating. After struggling with the thorny issue in 
a few difficult and obscure cases,48 the English court has finally come round to the view that a 
claim for dishonest assistance of breach of fiduciary duty should be characterized as a tort for 
the choice of law purposes.49 In Singapore, in spite of claims being put in terms of constructive 
trusts, the Singapore Court of Appeal did not flinch from analyzing the problem from the 
perspective of the characterisation of matrimonial property.50 In Focus Energy Ltd v Aye Aye 
Soe,51 the Singapore High court had no difficulty seeing a breach of fiduciary claim against a 
company director for misdirected funds and profits as resting on the characterisation of 
corporate duties or, alternatively, as a claim in restitution. 
[24] A further consequence of this analysis is that one can no longer hide behind the in personam 
label to enforce property rights on the basis of the same law that applies to the personal 
equities.52 Because choice of law is a necessary step after assuming jurisdiction, it is necessary 
to characterize the question before the court. If it is a property question arises, then the choice 
of law rules for property should then apply. This is an important point because a number of 
older English cases have exercised the in personam jurisdiction based on the personal equities 
of the parties to decide on questions like priorities of securities over foreign land, and even the 
foreclosure of mortgages over foreign land. These will need to be reconsidered in the light of the 
modern understanding of the equitable jurisdiction in the context of private international law.53 
The Broader Theme: From Territorial to Transactional Analysis in Choice of Law 
[25] On a broader level, choice of law rules have grown increasingly more sophisticated. This reflects 
the modern acknowledgement that the purpose of choice of law rules is to achieve justice 
between the parties. Particularly in the case of obligations, which normally arise because of 
transactional dealings or equities between parties, the trend has been to move away from rigid 
connecting factors, and one important and growing theme is the focus on the personal dealings, 
or “personal equities” in the broader sense, between the parties in the determination of which 
                                                             
45 See, eg, Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin [2005] 1 WLR 1157 (CA); OJSC Oil Co Yugraneft (in 
liquidation) v Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613 (Comm). 
46 A-G for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91 (CA), affirmed without reference to the choice of law 
point in [2003] UKPC 22. 
47  A first go has been made in TM Yeo, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (OUP, 2004). 
48 Analyzed in TM Yeo, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (OUP, 2004), ch 8. 
49 At least at first instance: OJSC Oil Co Yugraneft (in liquidation) v Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613 
(Comm). 
50 Murakami Takako (executrix of the estate of Takashi Murakami Suroso, deceased) v Wiryadi Louise Maria  
[2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA). 
51 [2009] 1 SLR 1086. 
52 Once thought to be invariably the law of the forum, but this is clearly not the case today. 
53 See TM Yeo, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (OUP, 2004), ch 5. 
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law to apply which will be most just and fair to the parties. The common law recognised this 
very early on in the case of contractual obligations, and the courts have long given strong effect 
to the parties’ choice of law in contracts. The law had moved more slowly in the case of torts, 
because the transactional equities are less obvious than in the case of contracts. However, this is 
recognised in the principle that one cannot always strictly apply the double actionability rule 
(the law of the forum and the law of the place of the wrong). Sometimes, it may be that the law 
governing the underlying legal relationship of the parties that is more relevant, and in 
exceptional cases, that ought to be the applicable law. The Singapore Court of Appeal took the 
common law one step forward by holding that the exception to double actionability can apply 
even to torts committed in the forum. There has been criticism that the court did not go far 
enough to remove the requirement of actionability by the law of the forum, in line with common 
law54 and statutory55 developments in some countries. There is some force in the criticism in 
substance, but the double actionability rule is perhaps too entrenched56 for court to have taken 
such a radical step without comprehensive arguments from counsel in the case.  
[26] Another trend reflecting this development is the theme of my lecture last year: the extent to 
which the parties’ choice of law agreement in a contract can affect the applicable law for non-
contractual obligations arising from the same transaction.57 In the European Union, the Rome II 
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations permits (with some 
restrictions) contracting parties to choose the law to govern non-contractual obligations, 
something which is already permissible in international arbitration generally. There are signs 
that the common law may be moving in this direction. A further consequence may well be the 
consideration of the question of whether and when damages and other contractual remedies 
may be available for the breach of a choice of law agreement,58  following analogous 
developments in respect of the choice of jurisdiction agreement. 
[27] Another development marking this trend can be seen in how a choice of law clause in a void 
contract can affect the choice of the law applicable to restitutionary claims arising from it. A 
somewhat simplistic view is that if the contract is void, then the choice of law clause can have no 
legal effect.59 The Singapore Court of Appeal in CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd60 has 
taken a more nuanced approach. It accepted that in cases where the parties have agreed to the 
choice of law clause and the vitiating factor did not directly impact that clause, there is nothing 
wrong with using that parties’ choice of law as a reference point to work out the consequences 
of the void contract. In fact there is a strong argument in favour of it as a fair reflection of the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. In that case itself, however, the court ignored the choice 
of law clause because both parties had conducted the appeal on the basis that the contract was 
void because one party’s agent had acted without authority. It is clear that if it had been a case 
                                                             
54 Canada (Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 SCR 1022) and Australia (Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v 
Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491). 
55 In England, the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 replaced most of the 
common law with a rule based on where the events constituting the tort occurred, subject to an 
exception. It has now been largely superseded by Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations (applicable to the European Union as a whole), which looks to the law of the 
country where injury occurred, subject to several exceptions. 
56 It was clearly stated to be Singapore law in Parno v SC Marine Pte Ltd [1999] 4 SLR 579 (CA), and has 
been applied on previous occasions: Ang Ming Chuang v Singapore Airlines Ltd (Civil Aeronautics 
Administration, Third Party) [2005] 1 SLR 409; Goh Chok Tong v Tang Liang Hong [1997] 2 SLR 641. Cf Teo 
Cher Teck v Goh Suan Hee [2009] 1 SLR 749 at [5]. Double actionability subject to an exception remains 
the choice of law rule in the majority of Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
57 TM Yeo, “The Effective Reach of Choice of Law Agreements” (2008) 20 SAcLJ 723.  
58 A Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (OUP, 2008), ch 11. 
59 Baring Brothers & Co Ltd v Cunninghame District Council [1997] CLC 108. 
60 [2008] 4 SLR 543 (CA). 
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of say, misrepresentation as to the subject matter of the contract (and not the choice of law 
clause) and the contract is subsequently rescinded, the choice of law clause would remain a 
relevant consideration. However, one could perhaps go a step farther to argue that the 
difference between a valid but voidable contract which is then rescinded, and on the other a 
void but ratifiable contract which is not ratified, is a rather technical one of domestic law.61 In 
both cases, there could be sufficient dealings between the parties on the basis of the choice of 
law agreement for it to be legally relevant to the restitutionary consequences of the void 
contract. The policy arguments in favour of a one-stop litigation venue in the court’s approach 
to jurisdiction agreement62 are highly relevant too in the way it should approach a choice of law 
agreement. 
Foreign Judgments 
[28] In Singapore, a foreign in personam judgment may be enforced by action at common law or, if 
from gazetted countries, be registered under one of two statutes for direct enforcement. A 
number of Commonwealth countries are gazetted under the Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Commonwealth Judgments Act,63 while Hong Kong SAR is the only territory gazetted under the 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.64 The principles in the common law and 
under statutory regimes are broadly similar (though not the same). Basically, a foreign 
judgment may be enforced if it is from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, it is final and 
conclusive in the foreign jurisdiction, the foreign court has, in the view of the enforcing forum 
(Singapore), international jurisdiction over the party sought to be bound,65 and it is a judgment 
for a fixed or ascertainable sum of money, and it is not subject to any defences. Defences include 
judgments obtained by fraud or in breach of natural justice and contravention of the 
fundamental public policy of the forum. It is important to note that foreign judgments may also 
be recognised, without being enforced, to raise an estoppel on a cause of action or an issue. The 
legal requirements are the same, except the judgment need not be for a sum of money. 
Foreign Judgment Obtained in Breach of Contract 
[29] One aspect of the in personam reasoning in the broad sense of focusing on the personal dealings 
between the parties operate in the way the law sees an agreement between the parties to 
submit to a foreign jurisdiction as a legitimate basis of international jurisdiction. It does not 
matter if the defendant subsequently reneges on the agreement and refuses to submit to the 
foreign jurisdiction in fact. Having agreed to submit, the judgment debtor will not be allowed to 
go back on his words and to deny the fact of submission. The common law has long recognized 
this principle. The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 attempts to broaden 
the international acceptance of this proposition. Under the common law, an agreement to 
submit may also arise by estoppel.66 This is another example of personal equities operating in 
the realm of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
                                                             
61 The best illustration of this technical difference is probably found in the law relating to minor’s 
contracts, where some types of contracts do not bind the minor until ratified, and some types of contracts 
bind the minor until rescinded, even though the vitiating factor is the same. 
62 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 254 (HL), especially at [27]. 
63 Cap 264, 1985 Rev Ed. 
64 Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed. 
65 Presence in or submission to the foreign jurisdiction at the time of the proceedings, or agreement to 
submit before or during the proceedings. 
66 See Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433 at 466. See also, in a different context, The Nile Rhapsody 
[194] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 382 (CA), and The Burns-Anderson Independent Network Plc v Wheeler [2005] EWHC 
575 (QBD), [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 580 at [39]-[40]. 
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[30] In this part of my lecture I focus on two slightly more controversial issues. The first relates to 
the narrower in personam sense and the way it can be used as a defence to the enforcement of a 
foreign judgment. If A agrees by contract that he will not enforce a foreign judgment against B, 
then B may obtain an injunction to restrain B from enforcing that foreign judgment against B in 
breach of contract.67 This proposition is so obvious that it is not stated as a defence in the 
textbooks. If A, by represents by words or conduct to B that he will not rely on a foreign 
judgment against B, and B relies on that representation to his detriment, personal equities are 
created and A can be estopped from relying on that foreign judgment.68 That is also too obvious 
a proposition to find stated in the textbooks. 
[31] The more difficult situation in the common law69 is where there is no agreement or estoppel in 
relation to the foreign judgment as such, but the foreign judgment is obtained in breach of a 
jurisdiction agreement.70 This is stated as a defence under the Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Act, but there is no mention of this in the Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Commonwealth Judgments Act, and its status as a defence under the common law is unclear. 
One has to be mindful that the Singapore court does on occasions exercise its jurisdiction even 
though proceedings are commenced in Singapore in breach of a jurisdiction clause if strong 
cause amounting to exceptional circumstances can be demonstrated. It may well be that a 
foreign court may have exercised its jurisdiction on the same principles. However, the argument 
in this case, as in the previous two examples above, is not that there is anything wrong with the 
judgment as such, but given the personal dealings between the parties, whether it is just that the 
foreign judgment should be enforced by the party acting in breach of contract. The issue of 
international comity is not engaged. There are three arguments in favour of such a defence. 
First, one of the remedies for breach of contract is a mandatory injunction to undo or prevent 
the effects of the breach. Thus, in principle, the innocent party can ask for an injunction to 
restrain the contract breaker from enforcing the foreign judgment because to do so would be to 
bring home the consequences of the breach of contract. As Atkin LJ pointed out in Ellerman 
Lines Ltd v Read:71  
If the English Court finds that a person subject to its jurisdiction has committed a breach 
of covenant, or has acted in breach of some fiduciary duty or has in any way violated the 
principles of equity and conscience, and that it would be inequitable on his part to seek to 
enforce a judgment obtained in breach of such obligations, it will restrain him, not by 
issuing an edict to the foreign Court, but by saying that he is in conscience bound not to 
enforce that judgment.  
[32] This was a case where the judgment creditor was restrained by injunction from relying on a 
judgment obtained in foreign proceedings. The judgment creditor had earlier promised the 
                                                             
67 This is the simple prohibitory injunction to enforce a contract (which is readily available as a remedy: 
Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App Cas 709), as illustrated in the anti-suit injunction to prevent the breach of 
a jurisdiction agreement.  
68 Showlag v Mansour [1995] 1 AC 431 (PC Jersey) at 440-441. 
69 In the United Kingdom, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 32, created a statutory defence 
for foreign judgments subject to the non-European regime. 
70 If there had been an anti-suit injunction previously issued by the forum and the judgment was obtained 
in breach of the court order, then a separate public policy defence of contempt of court arises, and the 
foreign judgment will not be recognized or enforced: WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in 
Sri Lanka [2002] 3 SLR 603; Phillip Alexander Securities and Futures Ltd v Bamberger [1997] ILPr 73. It is 
the conduct of the party procuring the judgment that is brought into question, not the foreign judgment 
itself. 
71 [1928] 2 KB 144 (CA) at 155. See also ED & F Man (Sugar) Ltd v Yani Haryanto (No 2) [1991] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 429 (CA) at 439. See further, A Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (OUP, 2008) at 
[9.32]-[9.36]. 
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judgment debtor not to bring those proceedings and had also lied in court about the dealings 
between the parties leading to the making of that promise. Under Singapore law, the lie in court 
would not be the basis of a fraud defence since it could not be said that there was fresh evidence 
not reasonably discoverable at the time of the foreign trial of the fraud.72 Under Singapore law, 
the case will have to stand purely on the breach of contract ground. Although there were a 
number of references to fraud in the judgment, the passage of Atkin LJ indicates that the breach 
of covenant was sufficient ground for the court to act. 
[33] Secondly, it would be a more pragmatic solution to refuse the enforcement of a foreign 
judgment obtained in such circumstances than to allow a counter-claim for damages for breach 
of jurisdiction agreement. Thirdly, it would bring the common law in line with the position that 
Parliament expressly provided for under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. 
[34] Under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act, there is discretion to 
refuse registration where it is not just and convenient that the judgment should be enforced in 
Singapore.73 For a long time, I have been puzzled by the case of Lam Soon Cannery Co v Hooper & 
Co,74 a decision by the Federal Court in Malaysia on an appeal from Singapore. There was a sale 
of goods contract between the parties. The buyer instructed the seller to put an earlier date on 
the bills of lading, which would put the seller in breach of contract. Subsequently, the buyer 
obtained an arbitration award against the seller for damages for breach of contract in the 
misdating of the bills of lading, the award was enforced as a judgment in England, and the 
judgment was then brought to Singapore to be registered.  
[35] The Federal Court refused registration on the basis that it was not just and convenient to 
enforce the judgment; the buyer would not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. At 
first blush, this looked like a very odd decision and appears to go against international comity in 
the refusal to enforce the foreign judgment based on the merits of the underlying dispute; the 
seller should have argued waiver of breach during the arguments on the merits, and it should be 
too late to raise the argument now.75 But there is another way of looking at the facts. Waiver is 
not the only possible construction. One could also argue that there was a separate implied 
contract at the time of the request: the seller promised to misdate the bills of lading on the 
buyer’s counter-promise not to sue the seller for breach of contract. On this view of the facts, the 
personal equities operated independently of the sale contract and the proceedings based on sale 
contract leading to the arbitration award and then the English judgment. The Federal Court 
directed no criticism at the English judgment or at the way the breach of contract action was 
resolved.76 The only criticism was levelled against the seller for reprehensible conduct in 
breaching a separate agreement not to bring an action on the breach of the sale of goods 
contract. 
[36] A question that will frequently arise is whether the innocent party had waived the breach of the 
contract and is thereby estopped from arguing that the judgment had been obtained in breach of 
                                                             
72 Hong Pian Tee v Les Placements Germain Inc [2002] 2 SLR 81 (CA). 
73 S 3(1). 
74 [1965-1968] SLR 76 (FC, Singapore). 
75 The conclusiveness of a foreign judgment on the merits was recently strongly affirmed in Hong Pian Tee 
v Les Placements Germain Inc [2002] 2 SLR 81 (CA). This principle also includes what should have been 
argued in the foreign court: see, eg, Wu Shun Foods Co Ltd v Ken ken Food Manufacturing Pte Ltd [2002] 4 
SLR 877. 
76 Alternatively, promissory estoppel could be argued. There was a promise not to enforce the right to 
correct dating of the bills and detrimental reliance which made it unconscionable in the circumstances to 
sue. The position of the seller having irrevocably been altered, the operation of this estoppel is not merely 
suspensory. It would therefore be inequitable for a party in breach of a promise enforceable in equity to 
enforce the legal right to sue (and consequently the foreign judgment obtained thereby). 
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contract. In principle that argument must be available. However, it should not be confused with 
the argument whether the innocent party had submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court 
in the sense that he had accepted the foreign court had jurisdiction (in the sense of legal 
authority) to hear the case. Submission is one of those tricky legal words which can have 
different meanings in different contexts. If all the party has acknowledged is that the foreign 
court could as a matter of law hear the case, then all he is accepting is that the foreign court has 
jurisdiction over him; it says nothing about whether he has forgiven the breach of contract. If, 
on the other hand, the party acknowledges that the court not only could, but should, hear the 
case, then he is saying that he does not regard himself or the other party as being bound by the 
agreement. The second amounts to a waiver of the jurisdiction agreement, but not the first. So, if 
a contracting party resists an argument that the existence of strong cause justifies the foreign 
court exercising jurisdiction, that is said to be a submission to the foreign jurisdiction, because 
he cannot ask the court not to exercise the jurisdiction without legally acknowledging the 
existence of the jurisdiction.77 But whether that is right or not as a proposition of law,78 it does 
not follow that the party has waived the breach of contract. Indeed, defending the action can be 
seen as an act of mitigation. 
Foreign Courts Acting In Personam 
[37] The second point I want to raise in the context of foreign judgments is the converse of Penn v 
Baltimore.79 It is generally accepted that a foreign judgment can have no effect on title to 
immovable property in Singapore.80 So a foreign judgment that orders the registration of 
property in Singapore is a nullity as far as Singapore law is concerned. Insofar as the judgment 
makes any pronouncement on ownership or vesting of title to property (whether movable or 
immovable), it can only be effective for property within its competent in rem jurisdiction, ie, 
property within its own territorial jurisdiction. But what of the in personam effect of the foreign 
judgment? What if the foreign judgment (like that in Penn v Baltimore) had ordered the 
defendant to take the requisite steps to convey the property? 
[38] The first objection is that such foreign judgments indirectly affect title to local land. However, if 
the court of the forum is prepared to make such orders itself on the basis that they act in 
personam and do not affect title to foreign land, it does not seem consistent with international 
comity to take this objection against a foreign court exercising a similar type of jurisdiction, if 
the foreign judgment is otherwise enforceable. This leads to the second objection. The law at 
present only allows the enforcement of foreign judgments for a fixed or ascertainable sum of 
money. Canadian law has taken the radical step of allowing the enforcement of non-monetary 
judgments,81 but the main line of reasoning is based on rendering assistance to litigation in 
foreign countries,82 and this has not yet been followed in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. On 
this basis, it is simply not possible to enforce foreign judgments ordering the transfer of 
immovable or movable property wherever situated. 
                                                             
77 At least in the context of international jurisdiction: Henry v Geoprosco International Ltd [1976] QB 726 
(CA). 
78 A more pragmatic approach was sounded in at WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control of Cricket in Sri 
Lanka [2002] 3 SLR 603 at [54], the court preferring to consider whether the party had “taken a step in 
the proceedings which necessarily involved waiving their objection to the jurisdiction.” The context is 
particularly relevant as it was dealing with the question whether the parties were still bound by their 
arbitration agreement in view of the legal proceedings in a foreign court. 
79 (1750) 1 Ves Sen 444, 27 ER 1132.  
80 Duke v Andler [1932] SCR 734; Loke Wan Wye v Registrar of Deeds, Singapore [1929] SSLR 234. 
81 Pro Swing Inc v Elta Golf 2006 SCC 52, [2006] 2 SCR 612. 
82 The Singapore courts have been far more restrained when it comes to assisting foreign litigation: Swift 
Fortune Ltd v Magnifica Marine SA [2007] 1 SLR 629 (CA); People’s Insurance Co Ltd v Akai Pty Ltd [1998] 
1 SLR 206. 
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[39] However, there are suggestions in two Singapore cases that a foreign judgment ordering the 
defendant to convey property in Singapore may be enforceable in Singapore. In Murakami 
Takako v Wiryadi Louise Maria (No 1),83 involving a dispute relating to matrimonial property 
located in various jurisdictions of an Indonesian-domiciled couple, the Court of Appeal was 
faced with many questions on an appeal primarily on issues of pleading, one of which was 
whether a foreign judgment which ordered the defendant personally to transfer immoveable 
property in Singapore could be enforced within the limitation period of Singapore. The 
enforceability in principle of the foreign judgment was not contested by the parties, and the 
court only addressed its mind to the question of limitation. For the purpose of the appeal, the 
unchallenged enforceability of the foreign judgment was treated on the same basis as the 
enforcement of a debt,84 which is at best a highly dubious proposition. In Murakami Takako v 
Wiryadi Louise Maria (No 2),85 the court in declining to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of 
forum non conveniens, assumed that a judgment from an Indonesian court ordering division of 
immovable property in Australia could be enforced in Australia.86 Since the same common law 
conflict of laws principles are applicable in Australia and Singapore on this point, by implication 
it is suggesting that an Indonesian judgment in relation to Singapore property would be 
enforceable in Singapore. 
[40] Does the law in Singapore now allow the enforcement of non-monetary foreign judgments? I 
don’t think the case goes so far. The starting point is that any foreign judgment from Indonesia 
may have some in rem and some in personam effect. In so far as it decides who owns property in 
Singapore, it is in rem and has no effect as a foreign judgment under the law of Singapore. 
Insofar as it orders a party to convey property, it is not a judgment for a sum of money and 
cannot be enforced as such in Singapore. Under Singapore choice of law rules, the law of 
Indonesia applies as the law governing the matrimonial property of the couple who are 
domiciled in Indonesia. The assumption made in the Murakami case is that this choice of law 
rule applies also to immovable property in Singapore,87 which is a reasonable assumption to 
make. This reflects that the personal dealings between the parties88 as a couple are of a higher 
order of priority than the situation of the land when it comes to choice of law. On the other 
hand, third parties dealing with the property ought to be able to rely on the lex situs to gain good 
title, eg, as a bona fide purchaser. 
[41] On this assumption, the proper thing to do with the Indonesian judgment is to produce it as 
evidence of Indonesian law for the purpose of applying Indonesian law as the choice of law, or 
get it recognised as an in personam judgment to raise an issue estoppel in Singapore. It is not to 
get it enforced. The party holding such a judgment has to plead a cause of action; in this case, it is 
based on property law, specifically, the law relating to matrimonial property. Singapore private 
international law recognises a choice of law category for community matrimonial property 
holdings, even though such a concept does not exist within the domestic law of Singapore. In 
this case, the choice of law rules point to Indonesian law. The only way for such a choice of law 
rule to work in so far as property in Singapore is concerned is to enlist the in personam 
reasoning in aid of the applicable foreign law. The in personam reasoning will then be used to 
replicate the matrimonial property rule that the court is enforcing.  
                                                             
83 [2007] 4 SLR 565 (CA). 
84 [2007] 4 SLR 565 (CA) at [15] and [27]. 
85 [2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA). 
86 Ibid at [36]. In this respect, see also Murakami v Wiryadi [2006] NSWSC 1354 at [51], where the New 
South Wales Supreme court appears to have assumed the same. 
87 See also Murakami v Wiryadi [2006] NSWSC 1354 at [51]. 
88 It is important to note that these personal equities was the basis of the Singapore court assuming 
jurisdiction in so far as foreign immovable property was concerned in the first place. In this respect see 
also Bunbury v Bunbury (1839) LJ 8 Ch 297 at 302-303. 
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[42] Thus, the steps in the analysis would be: (1) a claim for property rights to be adjusted in 
accordance with the applicable law for matrimonial property; (2) the recognition of an in 
personam judgment to raise an issue estoppel on how the property is to be divided between the 
parties (or their privies) bound by the judgment; and (3) the Singapore court grants appropriate 
relief accordingly after applying the law indicated by the relevant choice of law rule. The 
appropriate relief may involve using the concepts of trust to give the best effect to the applicable 
law. 
[43] A foreign court order ordering specific performance of a contract for the sale of land in 
Singapore (unlikely as the scenario might be today) would be “enforceable” in the same way. 
The contracting party will seek to enforce the sale contract in Singapore,89 and plead that the 
foreign in personam judgment be recognized to raise an issue estoppel on the existence of the 
contractual obligation to sell the land, and then ask the Singapore court accordingly for the 
decree of specific performance of that obligation.90 
[44] In other words, it is irrelevant whether the foreign court is acting in personam in the Penn v 
Baltimore sense. The more important question is what could properly constitute an issue 
estoppel from the in personam effect of the foreign judgment in terms of the substantive 
obligations of the parties. 
Conclusion 
[45] In summary: 
a. The maxim that “equity acts in personam” in its original sense of enforcement against the 
person only and not against his property is no longer of significance today, whether in 
domestic or private international law.  
b. Insofar as the maxim “equity acts in personam” is about the decree acting on the person: 
i. It remains important as a bypass technique in (a) allowing the court to assume 
jurisdiction (albeit subject to natural forum considerations) over persons in 
disputes relating to foreign land even though it cannot decide on questions of title; 
(b) allowing the court to restrain persons from carrying on foreign litigation even 
though it cannot give orders to the foreign court; and (c) allowing the court to 
restrict a person from disposing of overseas assets even though the assets are 
outside the jurisdiction and control of the court. But it is important to note that 
these are just techniques, and there are important substantive policies underlying 
each area. Many, but not all, have to do with personal equities. 
ii. However, the maxim has little significance in choice of law analysis. It does not 
provide a bypass to choice of law or characterisation. It may, however, be an 
                                                             
89 The contractual obligation does not merge into a foreign judgment: see, eg, JM Lyon & Co v Meyer and 
Goldenberg (1893) 1 SSLR 19; Malaysia Credit Finance Bhd v Chen Huat Lai [1992] 2 SLR 859. 
90 This analysis is borne out in Singh v Singh [2009] WASCA 53 (CA, Western Australia). Other cases 
where a foreign judgment purportedly declaring that the defendant held property (outside the 
jurisdiction of the foreign court) on constructive trusts have been successfully pleaded to be recognized to 
raise issue estoppel are: Buffum v Gordon (NSW SC, 23 September 1980); International Credit and 
Investment Co (Overseas) Ltd (in liq) v Adham [1996] CILR 89 (Grand Court, Cayman Islands). A finding by 
the foreign court of the absence of a trust can likewise be recognised: O’Hara v Chapman Estate (1988) 46 
DLR (4th) 504 (CA, Saskatchewan). Any attempt to enforce a foreign judgment declaring a constructive 
trust is bound to fail: see, eg, Koch v Chew (1997/1998) 1 OFLR 537 (HC, BVI). 
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important technique in replicating the property effects of a choice of law rule 
without directly affecting property rights as such. 
iii. Personal equities leading to the court acting in personam on a party may be 
relevant at the stage of recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment. Its 
particular significance to a foreign judgment obtained in breach of contract 
remains to be further explored. 
c. Insofar as the maxim that equity acts in personam reflects a concern of justice in the 
personal dealings between parties, this has had broad impact in all three areas of private 
international law: 
i. In the jurisdictional context, this is reflected in increasing significance of party 
autonomy in choice of dispute resolution forum (arbitration, litigation, or 
mediation). More recent developments include the award of damages for breach of 
jurisdiction agreements. 
ii. In the choice of law context, there has for a long time been a shift from territorial 
connections to softer connections which often pay greater attention to the 
personal dealings between the parties. One nascent area is the extent to which the 
parties can actually choose in their contract the law to govern not only their 
contract but also non-contractual obligations arising from the same transaction. 
Another development is the extent to which the choice of law agreement in a void 
contract can affect the law governing the restitutionary consequences of the void 
contract. A further question may be raised, following developments in the field of 
jurisdiction, whether there can be damages or other contractual remedies for the 
breach of a choice of law agreement. 
iii. In the context of foreign judgments, it has long been accepted that an agreement to 
submit to the foreign jurisdiction is a good ground of international jurisdiction 
entitling the foreign judgment to recognition and/or enforcement, whether or not 
the judgment debtor subsequently reneges on the agreement. This is a effect 
intended to be globalised by the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
2005. A more controversial question awaiting further judicial development in the 
common law is the effect of a breach of promise in obtaining a foreign judgment. 
d. Whether a foreign court has acted in personam in the equitable sense has no relevance to 
the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment in Singapore. In this context, 
completely different concepts of in personam and in rem are used, depending on whether 
the foreign judgment is intended to bind the parties to the judgment only whether in 
respect of personal or property rights , or to bind the whole world in respect of an item of 
property. A foreign judgment in rem only has effect for immovable property within its 
territorial jurisdiction and at best only has limited effect on movable property outside its 
jurisdiction. A foreign judgment may however, provide evidence of foreign law whether it 
is binding or not, for the purpose of applying choice of law. An in personam foreign 
judgment ordering the transfer of property, whether within or outside the foreign 
jurisdiction, is not enforceable at common law or under the statutory regimes because it is 
not a judgment for a sum of money. Nevertheless, it may be recognised for the purpose of 
raising an issue estoppel upon a cause of action sued on in the Singapore courts. 
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